



University of  
**Leicester**

Hard data and soft intelligence:  
how can we know if care is safe?

Mary Dixon-Woods,  
University of Leicester


# William Petty 1623-1687




# 17<sup>th</sup> century performance management

- Mortality 1678-1679, Paris and London
  - L'Hotel Dieu: 28%
  - La Charité: 14%
  - St Bart's and St Thomas's: 12%
- Petty concluded that 3,000 of those who died in L'Hotel Dieu
  - 'did not die by natural necessity, but by the evil administration of that Hospital'
    - <http://www.theactuary.com/archive/old-articles/part-6/the-works-of-william-petty/>

# Ignaz Semmelweis 1818-1865



# Vienna Maternity Institution: rates of puerperal fever 1841-1849




# Ernest Codman 1869-1940




# Codman's outcomes management

- Use of end-result cards




# Dartmouth Atlas



# NHS Atlas

Rate of major amputations on patients with Type-2 diabetes, 2004-2009




Source: Department of Health

# Need for measurement

- So measurement is really important if we want to know about quality and safety of care
- But....





- 44,000 to 98,000 preventable deaths
- Based one study from 1984 and another from 1992 using case note review
- Extrapolated figures using number of hospitalisations

- Used Global Trigger Tool; estimated 210,000 preventable adverse events annually that contribute to death of patients in US hospitals (34.4m hospitalisations)
- But we don't know how many are actually preventable

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REVIEW ARTICLE

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A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms  
Associated with Hospital Care

*John T. James, PhD*

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**Objectives:** Based on 1984 data developed from reviews of medical records of patients treated in New York hospitals, the Institute of Medicine estimated that up to 98,000 Americans die each year from medical errors. The basis of this estimate is nearly 3 decades old; herein, an updated estimate is developed from modern studies published from 2008 to 2011.

**Methods:** A literature review identified 4 limited studies that used primarily the Global Trigger Tool to flag specific evidence in medical

the national level. The amount of new knowledge generated each year by clinical research that applies directly to patient care can easily overwhelm the individual physician trying to optimize the care of his patients.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the lack of a well-integrated and comprehensive continuing education system in the health professions is a major contributing factor to knowledge and performance deficiencies at the individual and system level.<sup>2</sup> Guidelines for physicians to optimize patient care are quickly out of date and can be biased by those who write the

- Marked differences in GTT harm rates in 5 Danish hospitals
- Training, experience, procedures

Open Access

Research

BMJ  
open  
accessible medical research

## Experiences with global trigger tool reviews in five Danish hospitals: an implementation study

Christian von Plessen,<sup>1</sup> Anne Marie Kodal,<sup>2</sup> Jacob Anhøj<sup>3</sup>

**To cite:** von Plessen C, Kodal AM, Anhøj J. Experiences with global trigger tool reviews in five Danish hospitals.

### ABSTRACT

**Objectives:** To describe experiences with the implementation of global trigger tool (GTT) reviews in five Danish hospitals and to suggest ways to improve

### ARTICLE SUMMARY

#### Article focus

• To describe experiences with the implementation

## Preventable deaths due to problems in care in English acute hospitals: a retrospective case record review study

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Helen Hogan,<sup>1</sup> Frances Healey,<sup>2</sup> Graham Neale,<sup>3</sup> Richard Thomson,<sup>4</sup>  
Charles Vincent,<sup>3</sup> Nick Black<sup>1</sup>

- 5% of deaths deemed preventable
- Most problems related to quality of clinical monitoring,
- Most patients whose death was preventable were *older people*


# What about process measures instead?

- Medicare policy on tight blood glucose control in ICU patients turned out to be wrong
- Health Affairs (March 2009 issue) – conforming to quality guidelines had no impact on outcomes





### Wrong-site surgeries reported by year.



The Joint Commission  
Pham J C et al. Qual Saf Health Care 2010;19:446-451

# “Data for improvement”



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Social Science & Medicine

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed)



Studying large-scale programmes to improve patient safety in whole care systems: Challenges for research

Jonathan Benn\*, Susan Burnett, Anam Parand, Anna Pinto, Sandra Iskander, Charles Vincent

*Department of Biosurgery and Surgical Technology, Imperial College London, St Mary's Campus, QEOM Building Praed Street, London W2 1NY, UK*

- Insufficient data points
- Lack of sufficient baseline periods
- Changing samples and sampling strategies
- Inadequate annotations of changes

# The Health Foundation's Lining Up Research project

- An ethnographic study of interventions to reduce central line infections
- What happens when organisations are asked to interpret data definitions, collect data and report on CVC-BSIs?


# Measurement

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THE  
**MILBANK QUARTERLY**  
A MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF POPULATION HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY

What Counts? An Ethnographic Study  
of Infection Data Reported to a Patient Safety  
Program

MARY DIXON-WOODS,<sup>1</sup> MYLES LESLIE,<sup>2</sup> JULIAN BION,<sup>3</sup>  
AND CAROLYN TARRANT<sup>1</sup>



# Judging quality and safety

- Three major rankings of US hospitals
- MGH gets A from Leapfrog, ranked top by US News and World report, but gets 45 out of 100 from Consumer Reports
- Bottom six in the CR ranking all got A from Leapfrog
- <http://blogs.sph.harvard.edu/ashish-jha/hospital-rankings-get-serious/>

# **How Well Can We Identify the High- Performing Hospital?**

**Michael Schwartz<sup>1, 2</sup>, Alan B. Cohen<sup>1, 2</sup>,  
Joseph D. Restuccia<sup>1, 2</sup>, Z. Justin Ren<sup>2</sup>,  
Alan Labonte<sup>1, 2</sup>, Carol Theokary<sup>2</sup>,  
Raymond Kang<sup>3</sup>, and Jedediah Horwitt<sup>2</sup>**

Medical Care Research and Review  
68(3) 290–310

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DOI: 10.1177/1077558710386115

<http://mcr.sagepub.com>



Only a handful of consistently high performing hospitals,  
and may be a chance finding

# The story of one UK hospital

- Regulator rated this hospital as one of four “most improved” hospitals in 2006/7
- Based on self-assessment against core indicators, provisionally rated “good” in 2007/8
- Dr Foster’s Good Hospital Guide (2009) identified it as among 5 most improved over last three years
- November 2009 – ranked in best 10 in league tables for HSMR

# The story of one UK hospital

Sir Robert Francis said  
care was “appalling”

# The Inquiry

“Some of the treatment of elderly patients could properly be characterised as abuse of vulnerable persons.”



# The story of one UK hospital

“It soon became clear that the real position of the hospital in the national league of awfulness did not matter. What did matter was that many patients had received poor care and, for some, their treatment was appalling.”

- Dr Paul Woodmansey

<http://www.hospitaldr.co.uk/blogs/tag/mid-staffordshire>

# Culture and behaviour in the English National Health Service: overview of lessons from a large multimethod study

Mary Dixon-Woods,<sup>1</sup> Richard Baker,<sup>1</sup> Kathryn Charles,<sup>2</sup> Jeremy Dawson,<sup>3</sup> Gabi Jerzembek,<sup>4</sup> Graham Martin,<sup>1</sup> Imelda McCarthy,<sup>4</sup> Lorna McKee,<sup>5</sup> Joel Minion,<sup>1</sup> Piotr Ozieranski,<sup>6</sup> Janet Willars,<sup>1</sup> Patricia Wilkie,<sup>7</sup> Michael West<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Health Sciences,  
University of Leicester, Leicester,


## ABSTRACT

**Background** Problems of quality and safety

high-quality care. Organisations need to put the patient at the centre of all they do, get smart

# Intelligence

- Variability in quality of intelligence available to and used by boards
- Extent to which data converted into actionable knowledge and then effective response varied
- Problem-sensing versus comfort-seeking behaviours



# Measurement done badly

- Illusion of control
- Blindsight




# The reactivity of measurement

- Not just a problem of finding the right measures
- Measurement does not simply describe: it also acts on what it measures
- Measurement in healthcare is often deliberately performative



# Counting counts

- Goodhart's law – any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed on it for control purposes



# Measurement as discipline

- Organisations and individuals orient themselves to what is measured
- Hard governance: rewards and penalties tied to performance
- Soft governance: people internalise what it means to be “good” as defined by the measures
- Status regimes are created: elites and losers

# Some effects of performance measurement

- Kelman and Friedman (2009):
  - Effort substitution
  - Gaming




- Performance Improvement and Performance Dysfunction: An Empirical Examination of Distortionary Impacts of the Emergency Room Wait-Time Target in the English National Health Service *J Public Adm Res Theory* (2009) 19 (4): 917-946

# Effort substitution

- When people direct their attention to the thing being measured at the expense of other valuable activities that are not measured




# Gaming: deliberate attempts at manipulation



Under-counting of plague deaths to appease municipal authorities

# Intelligence

- If you're not measuring, you're not managing
- If you're measuring stupidly, you're not managing
- If you're only measuring, you're not managing



- The puzzle of measurement is that numbers are powerful and fragile, simple and qualified, trusted and distrusted simultaneously. (Power, 2004)

# Human Relations

<http://hum.sagepub.com/>

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**Counting, Control and Calculation: Reflections on Measuring and Management**


Michael Power

*Human Relations* 2004 57: 765

DOI: 10.1177/0018726704044955

# Fugitive knowledge

- Normalised so not readily visible
- May be hard to distinguish usual moans from serious concerns
- May be forbidden knowledge
- May be dangerous to reveal
- Its quality as evidence uncertain



# Conclusions

- No single indicator will tell you whether care is safe
- Measurement is performative
- Need multiple methods for problem-sensing
- Need ways of discovering fugitive knowledge in organisations