Yet for the two trusts with the lowest CQC ratings, these operational improvements – and the improvement skills and capabilities developed by the teams responsible for them – remained localised and were not enough to offset the trust-wide performance issues identified by the CQC and NHS Improvement.
Why was this? According to Barking, Havering and Redbridge’s former interim chief executive, Chris Bown, one reason was that the improvement work associated with the VMI programme at the trust was taking place ‘in complete isolation to everything else happening in the organisation’. With the trust’s leaders focused on dealing with the fallout from the trust being placed financial special measures by NHS Improvement and receiving a ‘requires improvement’ rating from the CQC in 2018, they had little head space to consider how to embed the VMI methodology across the rest of the organisation. Indeed, on his arrival in 2018, Chris Bown found that the trust’s board and executive team were ‘not particularly sighted’ on the VMI programme at that point. Some trust managers also found it hard to reconcile the VMI approach (of gradual, incremental improvement) with the turnaround model used to pull the trust out of special measures, which was geared towards delivering short-term shifts in particular performance metrics.
At Surrey and Sussex on the other hand, the VMI programme lay at the centre of the trust’s overall strategy. It was launched after 5 years of careful legwork that created a workplace environment conducive to the implementation of a trust-wide improvement approach. The trust had already co-produced a set of values with its front-line staff that ‘put the patient and quality of care first, above that of finance’, according to a senior figure.
It had also implemented a programme to strengthen clinical leadership across the trust, focused on giving front-line clinical teams the chance to take the lead in tackling quality challenges. And unlike Barking, Havering and Redbridge, which had three chief executives during the lifetime of the VMI programme alone, Surrey and Sussex had had the same chief executive in post since 2010, a stable executive team and a consistent strategic direction. This stability, and the leadership team’s visible and unstinting commitment to the VMI programme as the means through which the trust could strengthen its already strong position, was instrumental in ensuring that the programme was positively received across the organisation.
All of this suggests that the level and constancy of leadership investment in an improvement programme is an important determinant of its impact. If the programme is seen largely as a technical exercise to be led by a handful of experts working alongside front-line teams, then it is unlikely to enter the ‘mainstream consciousness’ of the organisation. But if it is seen by leaders as being core to organisation’s identity and strategic vision – as something that will inform how all staff approach their jobs – then it stands a much better chance of being embedded and having an impact at scale.
c) Focused improvement priorities and metrics, aligned with organisational and national objectives
Priority setting and measurement have often posed challenges for improvement teams. Many find it difficult to decide what to measure, or how to take reliable measurements to determine whether changes have led to improvement. The VMI partnership was no exception. For many of those involved, measurement was one of the most demanding aspects of the programme. In the absence of any centrally set improvement priorities and associated metrics that were common to all five trusts, it was left to each individual trust to decide what it was they wanted to improve, and how to go about it. The trusts’ different approaches to this task reveal much about their respective levels of improvement maturity, and also offer some important lessons to others planning improvement at organisation and system level.
For the two trusts with the lowest CQC ratings, the task of priority setting was seen as an opportunity to involve their workforces in the decision-making process around the VMI partnership. By asking staff to identify their priorities for change, and giving influential clinical leaders a key role in deciding which care pathways to select, the hope was that staff would feel ownership of the programme, and that a network of leaders willing to champion it would emerge.
The reality, however, proved otherwise. At Barking, Havering and Redbridge, timing was a problem. Inviting staff to name their ‘biggest issue’ at a time when the trust was grappling with major performance challenges, and fragile staff morale, created what one middle manager described as ‘a massive public finger-pointing exercise’. Moreover, the trust soon realised that the initial target selected for improvement after the engagement exercise – ‘the first 24 hours’ – was too broad. Translating it into a manageable improvement exercise with clear objectives proved too difficult.
Meanwhile, at Shrewsbury and Telford, the decision to prioritise the preferred improvement targets of influential leaders, rather than following the data and focusing on the trust’s biggest burning issues, also led to frustration.
The other three trusts opted for a different approach. They took the view that in order to secure sustained trust-wide support for the improvement work linked to the VMI programme, especially among managers, the care pathways and the metrics linked to them needed to be closely aligned with national and organisational level improvement priorities. Their executive teams also decided that priority setting was an issue of such strategic significance that they needed to take the lead in identifying them.
For example, it was the executive team at Leeds that chose orthopaedic elective activity as one of its care pathways, with the intention of using this improvement work to help the trust meet a series of national orthopaedic targets. The fact that the three trusts already had mature approaches to staff engagement in place, as well as established cultures of peer learning and knowledge sharing, did much to make this possible. Without this engagement work, the trusts’ executive teams may not have had the same licence or confidence to take a more directive approach. In the case of Leeds, the path to the VMI programme had been paved by a bottom-up, workforce-led approach to identify the values and behaviours that underpinned ‘the Leeds Way’, the trust’s cultural framework launched in 2014.
Nonetheless, all five trusts found it difficult, at least initially, to decide what metrics to set once they had selected their care pathways. In many cases they were set at too high a level. Coventry and Warwickshire, for example, developed a metric on the overall productivity of its theatres. But with more than 30 theatres, this metric proved too broad to pick up the significant improvements made in the trust’s handful of urology theatres.
What do these findings tell us? First, in common with many other analyses of improvement capability across the NHS, they highlight a marked shortage of measurement expertise within trusts. By the end of the VMI partnership, many of the participating trusts had developed a much better understanding of what metrics to select at each level, but the initial mistakes they made were hard to put right and had an impact on the momentum of the programme. This shows that strengthening the measurement capability of provider organisations and systems is essential, to equip them to lead major, large-scale improvement initiatives. Second, the findings underline the value of ensuring that the ‘golden thread’ between operational, organisational and national improvement priorities is maintained.
The evaluation’s findings in relation to the strategic judgement of the trusts’ executive teams are also instructive. Understanding when to open up key decisions to wider workforce consultation and when to take the lead is a vital strategic skill. The VMI evaluation suggests that stable executive teams, with experience of how to foster a culture of improvement in complex human systems, are better placed to make the right call (in this situation) than new leaders in challenged trusts with limited track records of staff engagement and peer learning. Any assessment of trusts’ readiness for improvement must consider the strategic maturity of their executive teams, especially in terms of their approach to staff engagement.